Matthew Ridgway

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Beginning his career during World War I, Ridgway was assigned to duty on the border with Mexico as a member of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, and then to the West Point faculty as an instructor in Spanish. He was disappointed that he was not assigned to combat duty during the war, feeling that "the soldier who had had no share in this last great victory of good over evil would be ruined."

During 1924 and 1925 Ridgway attended the company officers' course at the United States Army Infantry School in Fort Benning, Georgia, after which he was a company commander in the 15th Infantry Regiment in Tientsin, China. This was followed by a posting to Nicaragua, where he helped supervise free elections in 1927.

In 1930, Ridgway became an advisor to the Governor-General of the Philippines. He graduated from the Army Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1935 and from the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in 1937. During the 1930s he served as Assistant Chief of Staff of VI Corps, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Second Army, and Assistant Chief of Staff of the Fourth Army. General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, assigned Ridgway to the War Plans Division shortly after the outbreak of World War II in Europe in September 1939.

After being promoted to lieutenant colonel on July 1, 1940, he served in the War Plans Division until January 1942, and was promoted to the one-star general officer rank of brigadier general that month, after being promoted to temporary colonel on December 11 the month before.

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the American entry into World War II, Ridgway was promoted rapidly from lieutenant colonel to major general in the space of only four months. In February 1942 he was assigned as Assistant Division Commander of the 82nd Infantry Division, which was then in the process of formation. The division was under the command of Major General Omar Bradley, a fellow infantryman whom Ridgway highly respected. The two men trained the thousands of men joining the division over the next few months. In August, two months after Bradley's reassignment to command of the 28th Infantry Division, Ridgway was promoted to the two-star rank of major general and was given command of the 82nd Division. The 82nd, having finished all of its basic training and already established an excellent combat record in World War I, had earlier been chosen to become one of the army's five new airborne divisions. The conversion of an entire infantry division to airborne status was an unprecedented step for the United States Army, and required much training, testing, and experimentation. Thus the division was, on August 15, 1942, redesignated as the 82nd Airborne Division.

Initially composed of the 325th, 326th and 327th Infantry Regiments, all of which were due to be converted into glider infantry, the 327th was soon transferred out of the 82nd to help form the 101st Airborne Division, commanded by Major General William C. Lee. Unlike his men, Ridgway did not first go through airborne jump school before joining the division. He successfully converted the 82nd into a combat-ready airborne division and remained in command and eventually earned his paratrooper wings. To replace the 327th, Ridgway received the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Theodore Dunn, later replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Reuben Tucker. In February 1943 the 326th was also transferred out and replaced by the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, under Colonel James M. Gavin. In April the 82nd, which in Ridgway's mind had received only a third the training time given to most divisions, was sent to North Africa to prepare for the invasion of Sicily.

Ridgway helped plan the airborne element of the invasion of Sicily. The invasion, which took place in July 1943, was spearheaded by Colonel Gavin's 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (reinforced into the 505th Parachute Regimental Combat Team by the 3rd Battalion of Tucker's 504th). Despite some successes, Sicily nearly saw an end to the airborne division. Due mainly to circumstances beyond Ridgway's control the 82nd suffered heavy casualties in Sicily, including the division's Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Charles L. Keerans. During the 504th's drop on the morning of July 9, which was widely scattered due to friendly fire, Ridgway had to report to Lieutenant General George S. Patton, commander of the Seventh United States Army (under whose command the 82nd fell), that, out of the more than 5,300 paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division who had jumped into Sicily, he had fewer than 400 under his control.

During the planning for the invasion of the Italian mainland, the 82nd was tasked with taking Rome by coup de main in Operation Giant II. Ridgway strongly objected to this unrealistic plan, which would have dropped the 82nd on the outskirts of the Italian capital of Rome in the midst of two German heavy divisions. The operation was canceled only hours before launch. The 82nd did, however, play a significant role in the Allied invasion of Italy at Salerno in September which, but for a drop by Ridgway's two parachute regiments, may well have seen the Allies pushed back into the sea. The 82nd Airborne Division subsequently saw brief service in the early stages of the Italian Campaign, helping the Allies to break through the Volturno Line in October. The division then returned to occupation duties in the recently liberated Italian city of Naples and saw little further action thereafter and in November departed Italy for Northern Ireland. Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, commander of the Fifth United States Army, a fellow graduate of the West Point class of 1917, referring to Ridgway as an "outstanding battle soldier, brilliant, fearless and loyal", who had "trained and produced one of the finest Fifth Army outfits", was unwilling to give up either Ridgway or the 82nd. As a compromise, Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, along with supporting units, was retained in Italy, to be sent to rejoin the rest of the 82nd Airborne Division as soon as possible.

In late 1943, after the 82nd Airborne Division was sent to Northern Ireland, and in the early months of 1944, Ridgway helped plan the airborne operations of Operation Overlord, codename for the Allied invasion of Normandy, where he argued, successfully, for the two American airborne divisions taking part in the invasion, the 82nd and the inexperienced 101st, still commanded by Major General Lee (later replaced by Brigadier General Maxwell D. Taylor, formerly commander of the 82nd Airborne Division Artillery), to be increased in strength from two parachute regiments and a single glider regiment (although with only two battalions) to three parachute regiments, and for the glider regiment to have a strength of three battalions. In the Battle of Normandy, he jumped with his troops, who fought for 33 days in advancing to Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte near Cherbourg (St Sauveur was liberated on June 14, 1944). Relieved from front-line duty in early July, the 82nd Airborne Division had, during the severe fighting in the Normandy bocage, suffered 46 percent casualties.

In August 1944, Ridgway was given the command of XVIII Airborne Corps. Command of the 82nd Airborne Division passed to Brigadier General James M. Gavin, who had served as Ridgway's Assistant Division Commander. The first operation involving Ridgway was Operation Market Garden where his 101st Airborne Division dropped near Eindhoven to secure the Bridges between Eindhoven and Veghel on the road to Arnhem. Ridgway dropped with his troops and was in the forefront of the Divisions part of the fighting. The XVIII Airborne Corps helped stop and push back German troops during the Battle of the Bulge in December. In March 1945, with the British 6th Airborne Division and United States 17th Airborne Division under command, he led the corps into Germany during Operation Varsity, the airborne component of Operation Plunder, and was wounded in the shoulder by German grenade fragments on March 24, 1945. He led the corps in the Western Allied invasion of Germany. On June 4, 1945 he was promoted to the temporary rank of lieutenant general.

At war's end, Ridgway was on a plane headed for a new assignment in the Pacific theater of war, under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, with whom he had served while a captain at the United States Military Academy at West Point.

Ridgway spoke highly of British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, stating that his time serving under Montgomery was "most satisfying" and that "He gave me the general outline of what he wanted and let me completely free." Ridgway noted that while Montgomery was a "free spirit who was sometimes a bit hard to restrain," he also referred to Montgomery as "a first-class professional officer of great ability ... and Monty could produce ... I don't know anybody who could give me more complete support than Monty did when I was under British command twice ... I had no trouble with Monty at all."

Ridgway was a commander at Luzon until October 1945 when the XVIII Airborne Corps was disbanded. He was then given command of the United States forces in the Mediterranean Theater, with the title Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. From 1946 to 1948, he served as the United States Army representative on the military staff committee of the United Nations. He was placed in charge of the Caribbean Command in 1948, controlling United States forces in the Caribbean, and in 1949 was assigned to the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration under then Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General J. Lawton Collins.

In December 1947, Ridgway married Mary Princess "Penny" Anthony Long, his third wife. They remained married until his death 46 years later. In April 1949, their only child, Matthew Bunker Ridgway, Jr., was born. Ridgway's son was killed in an accident in 1971. His wife died in 1997.

Ridgway's most important command assignment occurred in 1950 after the death of Lieutenant General Walton Walker on December 23. Ridgway was assigned as Walker's replacement in command of the Eighth United States Army, which had been deployed in South Korea in response to the invasion by North Korea in June of that year.

When Ridgway took command of Eighth Army, the Army was still in a tactical retreat, after its strong foray into North Korea had been met with an unexpected and overwhelming Communist Chinese advance in the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River. Ridgway was successful in turning around the morale of Eighth Army.

Ridgway was unfazed by the Olympian demeanor of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, then overall commander of UN forces in Korea. MacArthur gave Ridgway a latitude in operations he had not given his predecessor. After Ridgway landed in Tokyo on Christmas Day 1950 to discuss the operational situation with MacArthur, the latter assured his new commander that the actions of Eighth Army were his to conduct as he saw fit. Ridgway was encouraged to retire to successive defensive positions, as was currently under way, and hold Seoul as long as he could, but not if doing so meant that Eighth Army would be isolated in an enclave around the capital city. Ridgway asked specifically that if he found the combat situation "to my liking" whether MacArthur would have any objection to "my attacking". MacArthur answered, "Eighth Army is yours, Matt. Do what you think best."

Upon taking control of the battered Eighth Army, one of Ridgway's first acts was to restore soldiers' confidence in themselves. To accomplish this, he reorganized the command structure. During one of his first briefings in Korea at I Corps, Ridgway sat through an extensive discussion of various defensive plans and contingencies. At the end, he asked the staff about the status of their attack plans; the corps G-3 (operations officer) responded that he had no such plans. Within days, I Corps had a new G-3. He also replaced officers who did not send out patrols to fix enemy locations, and removed "enemy positions" from commanders' planning maps if local units had not been in recent contact to verify that the enemy was still there. Ridgway established a plan to rotate out those division commanders who had been in action for six months and replace them with fresh leaders. He sent out guidance to commanders at all levels that they were to spend more time at the front lines and less in their command posts in the rear. These steps had an immediate effect on morale.

With the entry of China, the complexion of the Korean War had changed. Political leaders, in an attempt to prevent expansion of the war, did not allow UN forces to bomb the supply bases in China, nor the bridges across the Yalu River on the border between China and North Korea. The American army moved from an aggressive stance to fighting protective, delaying actions. Ridgway's second big tactical change was to make copious use of artillery.

China's casualties began to rise, and became very high as they pressed waves of attacks into the coordinated artillery fire. Under Ridgway's leadership, the Chinese offensive was slowed and finally brought to a halt at the battles of Chipyong-ni and Wonju. He then led his troops in Operation Thunderbolt, a counter-offensive in early 1951.

When General MacArthur was relieved of command by President Harry S. Truman in April, Ridgway was promoted to full general, assuming command of all United Nations forces in Korea. As commanding general in Korea, Ridgway gained the nickname "Tin Tits" for his habit of wearing hand grenades attached to his load-bearing equipment at chest level. He oversaw the desegregation and integration of United States Army units in the Far East Command, which significantly influenced the wider army's subsequent desegregation.

In 1951 Ridgway was elected an honorary member of the Virginia Society of the Cincinnati.

Ridgway also assumed from MacArthur the role of military governor of Japan, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. During his tenure, Ridgway oversaw the restoration of Japan's independence and sovereignty on April 28, 1952.

In May 1952, Ridgway succeeded General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) for the fledgling North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While in that position Ridgway made progress in developing a coordinated command structure, oversaw an expansion of forces and facilities, and improved training and standardization. He upset other European military leaders by surrounding himself with American staff. His tendency to tell the truth was not always politically wise. In a 1952 review, General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported to President Harry Truman that "Ridgway had brought NATO to 'its realistic phase' and a 'generally encouraging picture of how the heterogeneous defense force is being gradually shaped.'"

Ridgway urged the Anglo-French-American high commissioners for Germany to pardon all German officers convicted of war crimes on the Eastern Front of World War II. He himself, he noted, had recently given orders in Korea "of the kind for which the German generals are sitting in prison." His "honor as a soldier" forced him to insist upon the release of these officers before he could "issue a single command to a German soldier of the European army."

On August 17, 1953, Ridgway succeeded General J. Lawton Collins as the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. After Eisenhower was elected president, he asked Ridgway for his assessment of United States military involvement in Vietnam in conjunction with the French. Ridgway prepared a comprehensive outline of the massive commitment that would be necessary for success, which dissuaded the President from intervening. A source of tension was Ridgway's belief that air power and nuclear bombs did not reduce the need for powerful, mobile ground forces to seize land and control populations. Ridgway was concerned that Eisenhower's proposal to significantly reduce the size of the army would leave it unable to counter the growing Soviet military threat, as noted by the 1954 Alfhem affair in Guatemala. These concerns would lead to recurring disagreements during his term as chief of staff. Ridgway was the leader of the "Never Again Club" within the U.S. Army that regarded the Korean War which ended in a draw as a something of a debacle and were strongly opposed to fighting another land war in Asia, especially against China.

In the spring of 1954, Ridgway was very much opposed to Operation Vulture, the proposed American intervention in Vietnam with tactical nuclear weapons to rescue the French from certain defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, supported Operation Vulture and recommended it to Eisenhower, arguing that the United States could not permit the victory of the Communist Viet Minh over the French. Making matters more complicated on 20 March 1954, the chief of the French general staff, General Paul Ély, visited Washington and Radford had shown him the plans for Vulture and gave him the impression that the United States was committed to carrying it out. In a dissenting opinion, Ridgway argued that the plan would not work as he maintained that airpower alone, even with the use with tactical nuclear weapons, would not be enough save the French. Ridgway argued that only the commitment of 7 American infantry divisions could save the French at Dien Bien Phu, and predicated that if the United States intervened in Vietnam, then so too would China. Ridgway wrote that if China entered the Indochina War, then the United States would have to commit 12 divisions to Vietnam. Against Radford, Ridgway argued having the United States bogged down in a land war in Asia once again fighting the Chinese would be a costly distraction from Europe, a place that he maintained was far more important than Vietnam. In a dissenting report to Eisenhower against Radford's recommendations, Ridgway stated "Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives" and to fight a war there "would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities". Ridgway felt that Radford as an admiral who had never fought against the Chinese was too dismissive of Chinese power, and he did not see the dangers of the United States fighting yet another trying struggle against the Chinese, in less than a year after the end of the Korean war.

Ridgway's objections to Vulture gave Eisenhower pause, but Radford's vehement insistence that if three tactical atomic bombs were dropped on the Viet Minh forces besieging the French at Dien Bien Phu would be enough to save Indochina for France made the president indecisive. Both the Vice President, Richard Nixon, and the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, were all for Vulture and lobbied Eisenhower hard to accept it. Eisenhower himself felt guilty over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and during one meeting told Admiral Radford and Air Force General Nathan F. Twining: "You boys must be crazy. We can't use those awful things against Asians for a second time in less than ten years. My God!" Eisenhower finally agreed to carry out Vulture, but only if Congress gave its approval first and if Great Britain agreed to join in. The leaders of Congress gave an equivocal answer, rejecting the idea of Vulture as an American operation, but willing to support it if it was an Anglo-American operation. Finally, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill rejected the idea of British intervention in Vietnam, which killed Vulture. On 7 May 1954, what was left of the French forces at Dien Bien Phu surrendered, which brought down the government of Premier Joseph Laniel in Paris, and led to a new government being formed by Pierre Mendès France whose sole mandate was to pull all French forces out of Indochina.

President Eisenhower approved a waiver to the military's policy of mandatory retirement at age 60 so Ridgway could complete his two-year term as Chief of Staff. Disagreements with the administration over the administration's downgrading of the army in favor of the United States Navy and the United States Air Force, prevented Ridgway from being appointed to a second term. Ridgway retired from the army on June 30, 1955, and was succeeded by his one-time 82nd Airborne Division chief of staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor. Even after he retired, Ridgway was a constant critic of President Eisenhower. In the October 7, 1960 presidential debate, John F. Kennedy mentioned General Ridgway as among supporters of the position that the United States should not attempt to defend Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu from attack by China (PRC).

In November 1967, Ridgway was recruited to join the "Wise Men", a group of retired diplomats, politicians and generals who assembled from time to time to give their advice on the Vietnam War to President Lyndon B. Johnson. Though the "Wise Men" group whose informal leader was the former Secretary of State Dean Acheson were widely dismissed as a gimmick to allow Johnson photo-opps, the president did have much respect for the "Wise Men" and took their counsel seriously. In early 1968, Ridgway together with General James M. Gavin and General David M. Shoup expressed their opposition to the strategic bombing offensive against North Vietnam and declared that South Vietnam was not worth the trouble it was taking to defend it. The criticism sufficiently rattled Johnson's powerful National Security Adviser W.W. Rostow that he wrote a 5-page memorandum for the president arguing that Ridgway, Gavin and Shoup did not know what they were talking about and expressed supreme confidence that the bombing offensive would soon force North Vietnam to its knees.

In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive together with Johnson's near-defeat in the New Hampshire Democratic primary, where Johnson defeated the anti-war Senator Eugene McCarthy by only 300 votes, the White House was gripped by crisis with Johnson torn between continuing to seek a military solution to the Vietnam war or turning towards a diplomatic solution. Adding to the sense of crisis was a maneuver by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, to force Johnson to rule out the diplomatic solution and to continue with the military solution. On 23 February 1968 Wheeler told General William Westmoreland to advise Johnson to send another 206,000 troops to Vietnam, even through Westmoreland insisted that he did not need the extra troops. Under Wheeler's prodding, Westmoreland did make the request for another 206,000 soldiers, insisting in his report to Johnson that he could not win the war without them. Wheeler's real purpose in having Westmoreland make the troop request was to force Johnson to call out the reserves and the state National Guard. By 1968, there was no way to send another 206,000 men to join the half-million G.I.s already in Vietnam without abandoning the American commitments in Europe, South Korea and elsewhere except by mobilizing the reserves and the National Guard. Calling out the reserves and National Guard would disrupt the economy, which in turn would force Johnson to end the peacetime economy, and taking such a step would make it politically impossible to turn towards a diplomatic solution. The economic sacrifices that a wartime economy would entail could only be justified to the American people by saying the goal was to fight on until victory.

At the same time as the debate swirled over Westmoreland's troop request, Clark Clifford, a longstanding friend of Johnson's and a known hawk arrived at the Pentagon on 1 March as the newly appointed Defense Secretary. Clifford's friend, Senator J. William Fulbright arranged for him to meet privately with Ridgway together with General Gavin. Both Ridgway and Gavin advised Clifford that victory in Vietnam was unobtainable and he should use his influence with Johnson to persuade him to seek a diplomatic solution. The advice from Ridgway and Gavin helped to convert Clifford from being a hawk to a dove.

The Defense Secretary Clifford realized the political implications of the request for 206,000 more troops and lobbied Johnson hard to reject it, urging him to seek a diplomatic solution instead while Rostow advised him to accept it. Since Westmoreland had maintained in his report that victory in Vietnam was impossible without the additional 206,000 troops, to reject the troop request would mean abandoning seeking a military solution. To resolve the debate, Johnson called a meeting of the "Wise Men on 25 March 1968 to advise him what to do. The next day, the majority of the "Wise Men" advised Johnson that victory in Vietnam was impossible and that he should seek a diplomatic solution, counsel that was decisive in persuading him to open peace talks. Of the 14 "Wise Men", only General Maxwell Taylor, Robert Murphy, Abe Fortas and General Omar Bradley advised Johnson to continue seeking a military solution with the rest all speaking for a diplomatic solution. Ridgway's status as a war hero whom no-one could accuse of being "soft on Communism" added to the prestige of the "Wise Men" and made Johnson more likely to accept their advice. On 31 March 1968, Johnson went on national television to announce his willingness to open peace talks with North Vietnam, that he was unconditionally stopping bombing most of North Vietnam and finally declaring that he was withdrawing from the 1968 election.

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